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1The Effects of the Bank-Internal Ratings on the Loan Maturity.
Abstract
The paper focuses on the e®ects of three di®erent internal bank ratings { Risk-, Property-
and Creditworthiness-Rating { on the loan maturity. We use a sample of about 5,000
loans given to sole proprietors and corporate borrowers by two German banks from
January 2003 till July 2005. The estimation results for corporate borrowers are consistent
with Diamond's (1991) predictions of non-monotonic relationship between ratings and
maturity. The best rated and the worst rated loans tend to have shorter maturities than
loans with an intermediate rating. However, our results for sole proprietors con°ict with
the predictions of Diamond and with the majority of the empirical literature. We ¯nd a
negative association between ratings and maturity of the loans given to sole proprietors.
JEL: C25, D82, G20
Keywords: loan maturity, internal bank ratings, risk of default, creditworthiness.
21 Introduction
The role of internal ratings in commercial banking has recently received a considerable
attention in ¯nancial literature. According to Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(Basel - II) borrowers' rating is a criterion for minimum capital requirements imposed
on banks. The practice of assigning ratings in banking has expanded signi¯cantly over
the last 10 years (Krahnen and Weber, 2001). The rational for this expansion lies in
the willingness to diminish the impact of asymmetrical information and, therefore, to
develop a better bank-client relationship.
Brunner, Krahnen and Weber (2000) emphasize the unique informational role of in-
ternal ratings. In comparison to corporate ratings provided by external agencies, like
Standard & Poor or Moody, internal ratings give an informational advantage by pro-
viding non-public information about lenders. This information is based on hard factors
taken from the client's balance sheets and, less frequently, also on soft information like
the quality of a ¯rm's management (Grunert, Norden and Weber, 2005). Any company
speci¯c information obtained later in the bank-client relationship is also incorporated
into the internal rating (Weber, Krahnen and Vo¼mann, 1998). Furthermore, ¯nancial
literature points out that internal ratings are adjusted more rapidly than public bond
ratings when the general economic situation develops or the details of loan contract such
as collateral or covenants change (English and Nelson, 1998). Public debt ratings are
based on the long-term risk of default and, therefore, do not tend to change rapidly
over a business cycle. In contrast, bank ratings take into account potential losses over a
shorter perspective (Treacy and Carey, 2000).
The earliest investigations of internal bank ratings focus on methodology and expe-
riences of deriving internal ratings in the banking lending (Brunner et al., 2000). Recent
scienti¯c interest has shifted toward the topics of interdependence between ratings and
loan terms like interest rates, collateral and credit lines. Elsas, Krahnen, Rudolph and
Weber (1999) show that internal risk ratings in°uence the price of a loan. However,
there are only few studies exploring the relationship of internal borrowers' ratings and
the loan maturity. Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991) present alternative models that
3connect the issues of debt terms and ratings theoretically. Flannery suggests an upward-
sloping function of debt maturity with respect to risk rating, while Diamond predicts a
non-monotonic relationship between maturity and rating of a debt. The few empirical
studies on the link between borrowers' ratings and terms of lending also provide op-
posing evidences with respect to maturity. For example, ¯ndings of Barclay and Smith
(1995), Saunders and Altman (1997) and Machauer and Weber (1998) are consistent
with Diamond's model, while the results of Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame and Miller
(2005) disagree with both Diamond's and Flannery's predictions.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing discussion on the e®ects of
internal risk ratings on the loan maturity. The empirical part of the paper builds on the
credit ¯le data of two German banks that contain information on new and restructured
loans issued to business clients during 31 months (from January 2003 till July 2005).
The data set provides in-depth information on bank-client relationship, including data
on loan terms, client speci¯c information and internal ratings. Our results show that
the type of borrower matters for the link between ratings and maturity. The assigned
rating ¯gures a®ect the loan maturity of corporate borrowers and sole proprietors dif-
ferently. In particular, we receive a non-monotonic relationship between loan maturity
and ratings for corporate borrowers as predicted by Diamond (1991) and a monotone
negative relationship for sole proprietors. Regardless of the mixed evidence on maturi-
ties of moderately rated loans, we ¯nd that both sole proprietors and corporations have
the highest probability to get short-term loans if they have the worst ratings.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next chapter we review the theoretical and
empirical literature on internal ratings in banking. The second chapter presents our
working hypotheses. The data are described in the third chapter. The regressions'
results and their interpretation follow in the fourth chapter. Finally, the last chapter
concludes.
2 How is debt maturity a®ected by borrower's rating?
Flannery (1986) presents theoretic background for a positive relationship between bor-
4rowers' bond ratings and debt maturity. He suggests that riskier borrowers prefer long-
term debt despite higher interest rates. Long-term, high-risk projects may face higher
transaction costs in case of debt re¯nancing. Hence, high-risk ¯rms tend to issue long-
term debt, while ¯rms with low-risk projects have better chances to issue new debt and
choose short-term debt with lower interest rates.
An alternative model is presented by Diamond (1991). Low-risk borrowers issue long-
term debt in order to signal their low probability of default. Firms, which are initially
low-rated may simply face a refusal of long-term debt. At the same time, a company
might ¯nance a long-term project with short-term debt if it expects increasing pro¯ts
and is able to pay back a loan when it matures, and then take a fresh one. Hence, not
only riskier ¯rms, but also low-risk ¯rms may get short term credits. The intermediate
risky ¯rms issue long term credits in order to reduce the re¯nancing risk. Thus, in
contrast to Flannery, Diamond argues that debt maturity is a non-monotonic function
of the borrowers' risk rating. High-risk and low-risk ¯rms issue short-term debt, while
medium-risk ¯rms contract long-term debt.
Guedes and Opler (1996) test the models of Diamond and Flannery on a large sample
of public debt issues of the US corporations between 1982 and 1993. They ¯nd that ¯rms
with the best risk borrow on a long term and on a short term base, while medium-risky
¯rms issue the longest possible debt in order to avoid the risk of high re¯nancing costs.
Firms with the worst risk issue short term debt, which, according to the authors, is due
to moral hazard problems. Hence, the study provides evidence on the non-monotonic
relationship between the maturity of publicly issued debt and ¯rms' rating as predicted
by Diamond (1991). Barclay and Smith (1995) also ¯nd a non-monotonic e®ects of
¯rms' bond rating on debt maturity investigating the US industrial corporations from
1974 to 1992. In particular, they show that lower-rated ¯rms issue more long-term debt
than higher-rated ¯rms. However, small ¯rms with the lowest credit standing have more
short-term debt. Stohs and Mauer (1996) provide empirical support for Diamond's
hypothesis by examining the maturity structure of entire debt obligations, including
bank loans issued by 328 US ¯rms from 1980 to 1989.
5The main disadvantage of the above mentioned studies is that they do not distinguish
between stock debt and bank loans. According to the economic literature the maturity
structure of bank loans and the average maturity of public debt are di®erent. Datta,
Iskandar-Datta and Raman (2005) report that, on average, at least 61 per cent of debt
matures in 3 and more years, and 43 per cent in 5 or more years. Johnson (2003)
¯nds that about 46 per cent of public debt is due in more than 3 years. In contrast,
empirical studies on bank loans report shorter maturities. Berger et al. (2005) ¯nd an
average loan maturity of 1.5 year. One explanation of this phenomenon is that bank
loans have lower issuing costs and show therefore a wider spectrum of maturities at the
lower end. Firms usually approach banks if they need additional money to ¯nance some
short-term projects (e.g. for the purpose of a temporary increase in inventories or to
purchase new equipment). Such loans may mature within few months, weeks or even
days (e.g. overnight loans or evergreen credits with no ¯xed maturity). However, banks
also o®er medium-term loans that typically mature within 3 or 4 years, and long-term
credits which are due in 5 and more years. In fact, those loans are quite common in the
German banking system.
The obvious distinctions between bank loans and public debt require a separate
examination of the loan maturity. Dennis, Nandy and Sharpe (2000) focus on the e®ects
of ratings on maturity of bank loans. However, instead of using internal bank ratings
they account for the borrowers' credit quality only indirectly by using three proxies:
the borrower's pro¯t, retained earnings and working capital. The results predict a non-
monotonic relationship between borrowers' credit standing and loan maturity. Borrowers
with intermediate credit standing have long term credits, while riskier and less-riskier
¯rms borrow on a short term base. The authors also show a strong in°uence of ¯rms'
size on the loan maturity. Small ¯rms generally have signi¯cantly shorter loan maturity
than larger ¯rms. In contrast, Berger et al. (2005) examine the relationship between
loan maturity and internal bank ratings based on commercial loans' data of the US
banks. The results coincide with both the predictions of Diamond and Flannery for the
low-risk loans. This class of loans shows with 0.67 years the lowest maturity of all loans.
6However, the results for medium-risk, high-risk and extremely high-risk loans disagree
with Diamonds' ¯ndings. The respective maturities are 1.36, 1.58 and 1.67, predicting an
up-ward relationship between risk and maturity which is consistent only with Flannery's
model. The key question is whether the results received for loans of banks that are rooted
in the market-based anglo-saxon ¯nancial system apply universally because the scope
and extent of informational asymmetries depend on ¯nancial institutions. Accordingly,
one might expect that loans made by German house-banks follow di®erent rules with
respect to the link between maturity and rating.
Our research is closely related to these papers examining the link between bank-
internal ratings and loan maturity. We test the predictions of Diamond (1991) and
Flannery (1986) in order to check the character of relationship between ratings and ma-
turity. At the same time, our study di®ers from the previous research in three important
ways. First, the paper contributes to the research on loan maturity by using unique and
recent data of German banks. Second, we link the loan maturity to internal ratings that
are assigned by the banks to each borrower, and employ three di®erent kinds of internal
ratings used by the banks simultaneously. The ¯rst rating is the general Risk-Rating
that indicates borrowers' probability of default. The second rating { Creditworthiness-
Rating { re°ects borrowers' ability to pay back the borrowed money in full and on time.
The third type of rating { Property-Rating { is assigned based on the value of borrowers'
premises. Third, we test for joint rating e®ects.
3 The data set and descriptive statistics
3.1 Sampling
Based on a unique credit ¯le data of two German banks we draw a sample of 4,767 fresh
loans. The data contain information on duration of bank-client relationship, borrowers'
type, loan values, loan maturity, collateral as well as three types of internal ratings
assigned by the banks to each borrower. A loan is de¯ned as fresh if the loan account
enters the data set within the observation period. This de¯nition comprises new loans
7but also loans that are rearranged in the course of a restructuring of a client's debt. We
exclude the initial month from our sample since we are unable to discriminate between
existing and new loan accounts in the start-o® month December 2002. Thus, our actual
sample consists of loans entering the data set between January 2003 and July 2005.
In order to control for the ¯rm-speci¯c characteristics we divide the sample into
two sub-samples dependent on borrowers' types. According to the German Commercial
Registry we de¯ne two types of borrowers: corporations and sole proprietors. Sole
proprietors have drawn 2,433 loans (Sample A), and 2,334 loans belong to corporate
borrowers (Sample B). We di®erentiate between these two types because their legal
status and, commonly, the ¯rms' size is di®erent, and therefore their contractual terms
may be di®erent too. Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Scherr and Hulburt (2001) are among
those studies providing evidence that smaller ¯rms issue more short-term debt. Our data
do not provide information on ¯rms' turnover. However, the distinguishing between sole
proprietors and corporate borrowers helps to control for the ¯rms' size. Sole proprietors
generally run smaller businesses than corporations, so the annual turnover for them may
be smaller.
3.2 Ratings' measures
There is a common agreement that internal bank ratings result from the aggregation
of all client-related information obtained in the bank-client relationship. However, the
empirical literature on the banking risk management usually distinguishes between bor-
rowers' ratings and credit risk ratings. For example, Brunner et al. (2000) di®erentiate
the borrowers' and the actual loan rating. The former rating indicates the probability
of a borrower's default, while the latter takes into account the individually agreed loan
collateral. Feldman (1997) de¯nes loan rating as an estimate of a borrower's future loan
performance. However, to the best of our knowledge none of the studies employs more
than one internal rating in one model.
In our study we use three types of internal ratings that the banks providing our data
use in their practice. The ratings are the Risk-Rating, the Creditworthiness-Rating
8and the Property-Rating. Risk-Rating is a measure of the anticipated risk of a bor-
rower's default in the sense of the borrowers' rating of Brunner et al. (2000). The
Creditworthiness-Rating measures a borrower's creditworthiness, i.e. the anticipated
ability of a borrower to repay the loan according to Feldman (1997). Property-Rating
measures the credit standing of borrowers with respect to the value of premises, which
can be used to cover the debt payment in case of default. The banks changed the scales
of their rating measures over time. Therefore, a standardized rating scale from 1 to 3
has been created for each rating type to make the old and the new measures compara-
ble. The matching matrices are presented in Table 1. In order to make the estimation
process more convenient we generate a set of dummies for each kind of rating.
As three quality measures are available banks may allow for mutual compensation
e®ects, e.g. a bad rating in the Risk-Rating may be partly o®set by a better ¯gure in
the Creditworthiness-Rating. If such a mechanism exists, joint e®ects of the ratings are
also relevant for the loan maturity. A high correlation between the Property-Rating and
the Creditworthiness-Rating prevents us to check the joint e®ects of all three ratings.
However, we combine the Risk-Rating and the Creditworthiness-Rating and create a
set of dummies to indicate the combinations. Table 2 and Table 3 present a matrix
of relative frequencies of loans with regard to each pair of combinations. It is notable
that in our sample only few loans have a high Risk-Rating and at the same time a low
Creditworthiness-Rating and vice versa. In the model speci¯cation we include only those
combinations, which have relative high frequencies. The dummy indicating loans with
the best Risk-Rating and the best Creditworthiness is the base category.
3.3 Variables and Descriptive Statistics
An overview of the descriptive statistics is given in Table 4. The means and standard
errors of the variables used in the analysis are computed for each sub-sample separately.
Our dependent variable Maturity is a binary variable taking on the value of 0 for loans
that mature within 5 years, and taking on the value of 1 when a loan matures more
than in 5 years. The descriptive statistics show that 21 per cent of all loans given to
9sole proprietors and 25 per cent of loans given to corporate borrowers mature in more
than in 5 years.
The structure of the loan portfolio of sole proprietors and corporations with respect
to ratings is di®erent. With respect to the Risk-Rating the loans with the highest grade
are the largest group in both samples. However, the fraction of the best rated loans given
to sole proprietors is higher when compared to the best rated loans given to corporate
borrowers. The loans with moderate risk present about one quarter and one third of the
two samples, respectively. About one third of the loans in the sample of sole proprietors
and about 29 percent in the sample of corporate borrowers are assigned to the highest
risk group. With respect to Creditworthiness-Rating the fraction of the best-rated loans
is smaller than in case of Risk-Rating. It consists of about one quarter of the loans
in each sample. The biggest group in both samples present the loans with moderate
creditworthiness, while the fraction of the worst-rated loans takes about one third of all
loans.
Property-Rating is assigned only to about one third of all loans. The small fraction
can be attributed to the fact that only in few cases borrower's property can be used to
cover its debt. About one quarter of the loans in both samples has the best property
standing, while the loans with moderate rating present the largest group. In general,
our sample has a signi¯cantly smaller fraction of bad-rated loans compared to other
empirical studies, such as Berger et al. (2005) and English and Nelson (1998).
We control for three contract terms: collateral, commitment and loan value. The
dummy variable Collateral equals 1 if a loan is secured and 0 otherwise. Empirical
literature provides evidence that collateral is used to signal the quality of a borrower
and, therefore, can reduce credit rationing under asymmetric information and moral
hazard problems (Chan and Thakor, 1987). In our sample, a larger share of the loans is
collateralized by sole proprietors (95 per cent) as compared to corporate borrowers (78
per cent). The variable Loanvalue indicates the amount of the loan measured in thousand
Euro. Sole proprietors have on average smaller loans than corporate borrowers. We also
control for the duration of bank-client relationship, because as relationship lasts longer
10bank may get additional information about a borrower, which reduces the informational
asymmetry. This may reduce the risk of credit rationing associated with moral hazard
problems (see Peterson and Rajan (1994) and Boot and Thakor (1994)). The variable
Relationship is a measure of the duration of bank-client relationship in months. In our
sample relationship between the banks and sole proprietors before the observed loans
were issued had been lasting about 160 months on average, while relationship with
corporate borrowers - about 121 months. Empirical literature provides controversial
evidence on the bank-client relationship. Peterson and Rajan (1994) argue that closer
ties with credit institutions increase the availability of ¯nancing, while Ortiz-Molina and
Penas (2004) ¯nd no relation between loan maturities and ¯rm-bank relationships.
We are not able to control for the e®ects of commitment because of a very low
variability of that factor in our sample. In fact, 99 per cent of sole proprietors and 98
per cent of corporate borrowers in our sample draw loans under commitment. The rate
is signi¯cantly higher than those observed in the US bank lending practice, where 80
per cent of loans are made under commitment (Shockley and Thakor, 1997). In order
to control for time-speci¯c e®ects our econometric model also includes the time dummy
variables that indicate the year in which a loan was given. The dummy for the year 2003
is the base category.
4 Empirical Implementation and Results
4.1 Model speci¯cation
At ¯rst, we test the predictions of Flannery and Diamond separately for each rating.
Then, we examine joint e®ects of the ratings in order to check what kind of information
about borrowers may have the highest in°uence on the maturity choice. We model
separately the e®ects of the Risk-, Creditworthiness- and Property-Rating using a similar
econometric speci¯cation for each of the three models, which can be summarized as
follows:







11where Pi stays for the probability that loan i matures later than in 5 years. ¸ is a
cumulative density function of the logistic distribution. Rji are the rating-dummies.
Since each of the ratings has three levels, the model includes two dummies indicating
the intermediately and the worst rated loans. The best rated loans are taken as the
base category. Thus, j = 1;2 and Rij take on the values 1 or zero dependent on
the rating of a ith loan. Vzi, z 2 [1;Z] are the control variables such as loan value,
duration of the relationship between ¯rm and bank, collateral and time dummies. ¯j
and °z are the respective coe±cients. In order to estimate joint e®ect of the Risk- and
Creditworthiness-Rating we employ a set of dummies indicating particular combinations
of the two ratings. The speci¯cation is as follows:







where Cji represents a combination of two ratings with j 2 [1;k], and k equals the
number of all possible combinations of the two ratings minus the combination of the
highest Risk- and Creditworthiness-Rating, which is the base category. For each one of
Panel A and B we run separately 4 regressions testing the hypothesis that the probability
of long-term maturity will react to a change of the ratings. The regressions use logs of
independent variables, but we report only their marginal e®ects.
4.2 E®ects on maturities of loans given to sole proprietors
Table 5 shows the marginal e®ects of the independent variables on the loan maturity
for sole proprietors. To illustrate the quantitative importance of each e®ect in the
regressions, we also report in the bottom line of the Table the predicted probability of
observing long-term maturity for a reference loan, i.e. a loan with the best rating, while
all variables are taken at their means. The predicted probabilities in Table 5 and 6
show that ceteris paribus sole proprietors are more likely to receive long term debt than
corporations as they get the best ratings. Our data also suggest that moderately rated
loans of sole proprietors have a 11 per cent lower probability to mature in a long-term
12perspective than the best rated loans. Loans with the highest risk have an even 21 per
cent lower probability to mature in more than 5 years than the best rated loans. Thus,
the probability of observing a long-term maturity for a sole proprietor decreases as the
anticipated risk of default increases.
Our second regression estimates the e®ects of the borrowers credit standing. The
results predict a negative relationship between the Creditworthiness-Rating and loan
maturity which is similar to the e®ect of the Risk-Rating. In particular the probability
of observing long-term maturity is by about 2 per cent lower for loans with a medium
rating as compared to the best rated loans. However, the e®ect is statistically not
signi¯cant. Thus, we can not reject the zero hypothesis. In contrast, our result for the
lowest rated loans provide a statistically signi¯cant evidence on a negative relationship.
In fact, this group of loans has the highest probability to mature in short term - by 17
percent lower as compared to the best rated loans.
Our predictions on Property-Rating follow the pattern of the Creditworthiness-
Rating. There is a negative e®ect on the probability of long-term maturity for medium-
rated loans. However, the coe±cient is statistically not signi¯cant. The probability of
observing shorter maturity for low-rated premises is by about 30 per cent higher than
for the best rated premises. Hence, a low trust in the value of the borrower's premises
that can be taken over in case of default induces a shorter loan maturity. Thus, our
results imply in general a negative relationship between ratings and maturity of loans
given to sole proprietors.
Collateral has a positive e®ect in all three regressions suggesting that secured loans
mature later than those not-secured. The result con°icts with Berger et al. (2005),
who predict a negative e®ect of collateral on maturity arguing that banks may require
collateral especially from low rated ¯rms because of moral hazard or adverse selection
problems. In contrast, our results support the hypothesis that collateral is used to signal
the quality of borrower and, therefore, can reduce credit rationing under asymmetric
information and moral hazard problems as predicted by (Chan and Thakor, 1987). This
is also consistent with the theoretical implication of collateral as a signaling device
13suggested by Bester (1985) and Besanko and Thakor (1987). Moreover the possibility to
seize collateral reduces the loss given default for the bank. Thus it is to be expected that
banks act less strict with respect to maturity if collateral can be pledged. The duration
of bank-client relationship has a statistically signi¯cant positive e®ect on the dependent
variables. However, the practical magnitude of the relationship is very small. We ¯nd
also evidence that probability to get a long-term loan increases as the loan value grows.
The results for joint e®ects of the Risk- and the Creditworthiness-Rating are generally
consistent with those obtained in separate regressions (see Table 7). The combination of
the best ¯gures in both ratings is the base category. The sign across rating dummies is
negative, suggesting that loans are more likely to mature in short-term as their rating in
both categories gets worse. In general, the estimation results for sole proprietors predict
a downward relationship between the loan maturity and borrowers' risk of default, credit
standing and property value. Loans are more likely to mature in a shorter period as
ratings become worse.
4.2.1 E®ects on maturities of loans given to corporations
The results of the regressions for corporate borrowers support our assumption that
ratings have di®erent e®ects on maturity if borrowers are of di®erent types (see Table
6). Firstly, the predicted probabilities of observing a long-term loan among corporative
clients with the best ratings is signi¯cantly lower than for sole proprietors. Secondly,
there is a non-monotonic relationship between each of the ratings and maturity. As
Risk-, Creditworthiness- or Property-Rating become worse { from the best class to the
moderate class { the probability of longer maturity increases by about 17, 20 and 31 per
cent, respectively. In contrast, the worst rated loans are more likely to be short-termed.
So borrowers with the highest risk of default are by about 18 per cent more likely to
get short-term loans than borrowers with the lowest risk. Poor creditworthiness reduces
the probability of long-term loans by about 8 per cent, while a low Property-Rating
decreases the probability by 24 per cent.
Collateral and duration of bank-client relationship have a statistically signi¯cant
14positive e®ect on maturity across all tree regressions, albeit the practically magnitude
of the later factor is very small. These ¯ndings coincide with the results obtained
for sample A. The increase in loan amount is associated with higher probability of
long-term maturity when we control for the Risk- and the Creditworthiness-Rating.
However, for the model that includes the Property-Rating as explanatory variable we
get an unexpected negative sign for the ln(Loanvalue).
The joint e®ects of ratings for corporate borrowers coincide with those obtained for
separate ratings. Borrowers with medium ¯gures in risk of default and credit standing
are more likely to get long-term loans as compared to the rest, while the loans with
the worst Risk- and Creditworthiness-Rating tend to mature in a shorter perspective
than the best rated loans. Furthermore, the results reveal an interesting fact about the
magnitude of information concerning a borrower's risk of default and his creditworthi-
ness. Loans with the best Risk-Rating are more likely to have long-term maturity as the
Creditworthiness-Rating becomes worse, suggesting that borrowers with excellent credit
solvency have the best chances to get short-term loans. In general, the data analysis
of loans given to corporate borrowers suggests a non-monotonic relationship between
ratings and maturity.1
5 Conclusion
This paper explores the link between internal bank ratings and loan maturity. Using
a large sample of fresh loans issued by two German banks we test the theoretical pre-
dictions of Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991). In the test we employ data on three
types of internal ratings, on contract terms, on ¯rm-speci¯c characteristics and on the
bank-client relationship. Our results for corporate borrowers are consistent with predic-
tions of Diamond. Ceteris paribus, high-rated borrowers and low-rated borrowers tend
to have short-term loans, while loans given to medium-rated borrowers tend to mature
1We experimented with samples for both corporate borrowers and sole proprietors that exclude real
estate ¯rms. However, as the results for the reduced samples are in line with those obtained for the
complete sample, we forgo the presentation of these results.
15in longer term. The e®ect has the same pattern across all three types of ratings. In con-
trast, our results for sole proprietors support the predictions of Diamond only partially.
Ceteris paribus, maturity tends to be shorter when the ratings get worse. Thus, our
data evidence that ratings' e®ects on loan maturities di®er with the type of borrowers.
While being generally consistent with the results obtained for separate ratings, the
analysis of the ratings' joint e®ects reveals the fact, that corporate borrowers' credit
standing is more determinative for the loan maturity than their risk of default. In
fact, loans with the best Creditworthiness-Rating tend to mature in shorter term then
those with moderate credit standing regardless of the respective Risk-Rating. This
constellation suggests that there is no mutual compensation of rating ¯gures in di®erent
categories. The highest probability to get long-term loans have the borrowers with both,
a moderate default risk and credit solvency, while those with the highest risk and the
poorest creditworthiness have the highest likelihood to get short-term loans.
In general, the maturity policy of the German banks we investigate is more geared by
the rating numbers than by the relationship duration. In the wake of Basel II it seems
as if German house-banks reorient their business model towards the more arms-length
lending policy of US-banks. We believe that a detailed comparative analysis of US bank
data and German bank data would shed more light on the important question of whether
there is convergence of both business models.
16References
Barclay, M. J. and Smith, C. W. J. (1995), `The maturity structure of corporate debt',
Journal of Finance 50(2), 609{31.
Berger, A. N., Espinosa-Vega, M. A., Frame, S. W. and Miller, N. H. (2005), `Debt
maturity, risk, and asymmetric information', Journal of Finance 60(6), 2895{2923.
Besanko, D. and Thakor, A. V. (1987), `Collateral and rationing: Sorting equilibria
in monopolistic and competitive credit markets', International Economic Review
28(3), 671{89.
Bester, H. (1985), `Screening vs. rationing in credit markets with imperfect information',
American Economic Review 75(4), 850{55.
Boot, A. W. A. and Thakor, A. V. (1994), `Moral hazard and secured lending in an
in¯nitely repeated credit market game', International Economic Review 35(4), 899{
920.
Brunner, A., Krahnen, J. P. and Weber, M. (2000), `Information production in credit
relationships: On the role of internal ratings in commercial banking', CFS Working
Paper (2000/10).
Chan, Y.-S. and Thakor, A. V. (1987), `Collateral and competitive equilibria with moral
hazard and private information', Journal of Finance 42(2), 345{63.
Datta, S., Iskandar-Datta, M. and Raman, K. (2005), `Managerial stock ownership and
the maturity structure of corporate debt', Journal of Finance 60(5), 2333{2350.
Dennis, S., Nandy, D. and Sharpe, G. (2000), `The determinants of contract terms
in bank revolving credit agreements', Journal of ¯nancial and quantative analysis
35(1), 87{110.
Diamond, D. W. (1991), `Debt maturity structure and liquidity risk', The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 106(3), 709{37.
17Elsas, R., Krahnen, J. P., Rudolph, B. and Weber, M. (1999), `Risikoorientiertes kred-
itmanagement deutscher banken', Die Bank 3/99, 190{199.
English, W. B. and Nelson, W. R. (1998), Bank risk rating of business loans, Technical
report.
Feldman, R. (1997), `Banks and a big change in technology called credit scoring', The
Region pp. 19{25.
Flannery, M. J. (1986), `Asymmetric information and risky debt maturity choice', Jour-
nal of Finance 41(1), 19{37.
Grunert, J., Norden, L. and Weber, M. (2005), `The role of non-¯nancial factors in
internal credit ratings', Journal of Banking & Finance 29(3), 509{531.
Guedes, J. and Opler, T. (1996), `The determinants of the maturity of corporate debt
issues', Journal of Finance 51(5), 1809{33.
Johnson, S. A. (2003), `Debt maturity and the e®ects of growth opportunities and liq-
uidity risk on leverage', Review of Financial Studies 16(1), 209{236.
Krahnen, J. P. and Weber, M. (2001), `Generally accepted rating principles: A primer',
Journal of Banking & Finance 25(1), 3{23.
Machauer, A. and Weber, M. (1998), `Bank behaviour based in internal credit ratings
of borrowers', CFS Working Paper (98/08).
Ortiz-Molina, H. and Penas, M. (2004), `Lending to small business: The role of loan
maturity in adressing information problems', Discussion Paper Nr.99, Tilburg Uni-
versity, Center for Economic Research .
Peterson, M. A. and Rajan, R. G. (1994), `The bene¯ts of lending relationships: Evidence
from small business data', Journal of Finance 49(1), 3{37.
18Saunders, A. and Altman, E. I. (1997), `Credit risk measurement: Developments over
the last 20 years', Journal of Banking and Finance 21(11-12), 1721{1742.
Scherr, F. C. and Hulburt, H. M. (2001), `The debt maturity structure of small ¯rms',
Financial Management 30(1).
Shockley, R. L. and Thakor, A. V. (1997), `Bank loan commitment contracts: Data,
theory, and tests', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 29(4), 517{34.
Stohs, M. H. and Mauer, D. C. (1996), `The determinants of corporate debt maturity
structure', Journal of Business 69(3), 279{312.
Treacy, W. F. and Carey, M. (2000), `Credit risk rating systems at large us banks',
Journal of Banking & Finance 24(1-2), 167{201.
Weber, M., Krahnen, J. P. and Vo¼mann, F. (1998), Risikomessung im kreditgesch"aft:
Eine empirische analyse bankinterner ratingverfahren, in `Sonderforschungsbereich
504', Vol. 98-45, Universit"at Mannheim.
19Appendix
Table 1: Standardization of ratings
Standardized Rating Rating (old) 2 Rating (new) 3
1 High rating G Fully-secured 1 (A) Normal Business
(Low risk) A Very low risk 1 (A+) Normal Business
B Low Risk 1 (A-) Normal Business
1 (AA) Normal Business
1 (AA+) Normal Business
1 (AA-) Normal Business
1 (AAA) Normal Business






2 Medium rating C Medium Risk 7 Normal Business





3 Low rating D High Risk 13 Conspicuous Engagements
(High Risk) E Very high Risk 14 Conspicuous Engagements
15 Conspicuous Engagements
16 Bad-debt reserve built up
2The scale with alphabetic notation was used by the banks till the August 2004.
3Currently used scale.
20Table 2: Matrix of Ratings Interactions for sole proprietors
Creditworthiness1 Creditworthiness2 Creditworthiness3 Total
Risk1 25.24 16.89 1.27 43.40
Risk2 0.86 20.22 3.62 24.70
Risk3 0.53 0.66 30.70 31.89
Total 26.63 37.77 35.59 100.00
Table 3: Matrix of Ratings Interactions for corporations
Creditworthiness1 Creditworthiness2 Creditworthiness3 Total
Risk1 22.54 12.68 3.00 38.22
Risk2 1.59 27.85 3.81 33.25
Risk3 0.56 1.59 26.39 28.53

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22Table 5: Marginal e®ects on maturity for sole proprietors (Sample A)
(1) (2) (3)
Collateral (d) 0.1271* 0.1399** 0.2921*
(0.0563) (0.0466) (0.1320)
Relationship 0.0007*** 0.0007*** 0.0013***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003)














Â2 202.709 169.367 71.379
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-Likelihood -1106 -1125 -481
R2 0.102 0.087 0.092
N 2417 2417 802
P(Maturity)(for the highest Rating) 0.29 0.26 0.48
Note1: marginal e®ects for discrete change of dummy variables from 0 to 1;
Note2: *signi¯cant at 10%; **signi¯cant at 5%; ***signi¯cant at 1%.
23Table 6: Marginal e®ects on maturity for corporations (Sample B)
(1) (2) (3)
Collateral (d) 0.1764*** 0.1288*** 0.2811***
(0.0201) (0.0186) (0.0666)
Relationship 0.0013*** 0.0011*** 0.0025***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0006)














Â2 300.202 310.658 152.402
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log-Likelihood -1020 -1059 -346
R2 0.209 0.179 0.310
N 2291 2291 728
P(Maturity)(for the highest Rating) 0.22 0.17 0.32
Note1: marginal e®ects for discrete change of dummy variables from 0 to 1;
Note2: *signi¯cant at 10%; **signi¯cant at 5%; ***signi¯cant at 1%.
24Table 7: Joint e®ects of ratings on maturity
Sample A Sample B






Risk1*Creditworthiness2 (d) 0.0467 0.1363***
(0.0304) (0.0334)
Risk2*Creditworthiness2 (d) -0.0900*** 0.2495***
(0.0264) (0.0277)







P(Maturity) (for the highest rating) 0.28 0.17
Note1: marginal e®ects for discrete change of dummy variables from 0 to 1;
Note2: *signi¯cant at 10%; **signi¯cant at 5%; ***signi¯cant at 1%.
25